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John Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes: Physico-mathematics, Method and Corpuscular-
Mechanism, 1618-1633 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), xix + 631 pp. £153.00. ISBN
978-94-007-4745-6.
In the partly autobiographical preface to this magisterial account of Descartes’s
physics, John Schuster tells us that he is “here presenting my second attempt at a
Descartes for historians of science’” (p. ix). The first attempt was in his Princeton
PhD dissertation, completed in 1977, which, as Schuster reports second-hand, has
been seen as an “underground classic” (p.v) in the history of science. Schuster’s
dissertation was surely the first serious attempt to show that, contrary to what
philosophers and historians of philosophy were assuming (who saw him as chiefly
concerned with problems of epistemology, personal identity, the mind-body problem,
and other canonical issues in philosophy), Descartes was an innovatory natural
philosopher, developing a new method for understanding and explaining the workings
of the physical world. If Schuster himself did not immediately capitalize on his own
important insights, his message did make an impact on historians of philosophy, such
as Stephen Gaukroger, Gary Hatfield, and Daniel Garber, who began to pay closer
attention to the real historical Descartes, rather than the Descartes of the
“philosophical canon”. If Schuster’s role in the re-assessment of Descartes and his
work has been overshadowed by these more prolific writers, this “second attempt”
ought to establish him, at last, as one of the foremost commentators on Descartes.
What we have in this meticulously detailed and densely argued book is a
reconstruction of the development of Descartes’s thought from his introduction to the
new physico-mathematical way of Isaac Beeckman in 1618 up to the Principia
philosophiae of 1644 (presumably the title, and the opening claim, on p.1, to take the
reader to 1633 are remnants of an earlier version). But Schuster does not just tell us
what Descartes thought at different points in his career, he also explains why he
thought that way, and as the story unfolds, he carefully explains what led Descartes to
change his mind, and how and why he went on to new ways of thinking. The story, as
Schuster says, is “marked by determined planning, unintended shifts and some
spectacular insights, some decisively fruitful, some disastrously misleading, all in turn
conditioned by the varied environments in which Descartes moved” (p.23). At some
points Schuster necessarily indulges in speculation, but these are always confined to
comparatively small details, and he never makes the mistake of basing his subsequent
account on his speculations. Even so, they are enlightening to read because they show
a master craftsman at work—an intellectual historian at the top of his game,
speculating on the basis of an extraordinary familiarity with his subject. Schuster is
also adept at what he calls “charitable interpretations”, in which he overlooks what
seem to us to be obvious flaws (and which stall our efforts to understand what
Descartes was trying to achieve) and puts a favourable gloss on Descartes’s
pronouncements, thereby bringing out their internal consistency and even their
impressive coherence. At one point, Schuster even indulges in counter-factual history
(pp.416-18), as a way of confirming his analysis of the real events, and making sense
of why Descartes moved forward as he did. In all cases, Schuster writes with
impressive assurance and a seemingly unassailable authority.
Important aspects of the authoritativeness of Schuster’s account are his acute
awareness of the importance of methodology (whether Descartes’s, or his own as a
historian), and previous historiography. Schuster insists that his reconstruction of
Descartes’s career would not have been possible if not for his “career-long concern
with historiographical problems and historical category formation in the history of
science” (p. vii), and his consideration of previous historical accounts, and how and
why they turned out to be correct or otherwise, certainly adds an extra dimension to
Schuster’s account. It serves as an important reminder that previous historiography
becomes part of the history, whether we want it to or not. In this connection,
historians of philosophy may be interested to read Schuster’s separation of himself
and his book from “the empire of history of philosophy” (p. viii). Schuster’s aim is
not to confirm Descartes’s standing as an ahistorical philosopher, and insists that his
concerns are “unremittingly historical”. A word of warning is perhaps appropriate at
this point, however. Schuster’s close-up analytical account of Descartes’s thought
reads like what would once have been called “internalist history of science”.
Schuster’s concern is not with problems of social order in early seventeenth-century
France, much less with how developments in book production affected social
networks in the republic of letters, say, nor with how the concerns of patrons affected
claims about the natural world. No, his concern is with Descartes’s successive
theories and why he subscribed to them, and as such he considers the competing
theories of others, whether Ancients or moderns, and their ability to command
consensus, or not.
This is not to say that Schuster dismissively disregards relevant “external
factors”, as an old-fashioned internalist might once have done, but he is satisfied by
simply acknowledging the point and is then ready to move on. Consider, for example,
his analysis of Desartes’s theory of motion as presented in the Principia (p.583):
As is well known, Descartes was at great pains earlier in the Principles to
establish a ‘philosophical’ (as opposed to vulgar) definition of motion. In such
philosophically conceived motion, a body must translate from the vicinity of
the layer of matter immediately contiguous to it at its initial position.
According to Descartes… the Earth does not accomplish such motion. But
what is the status of this doctrine? Some excellent scholars take Descartes
perfectly seriously on these points and accept that this was Descartes’ default
and fundamental position on motion, and hence motion of the Earth… I…
tend to agree with other, equally adept scholars, who would argue that what
we have here is an elaborate smoke screen set down before the fact of possible
theological objections (or worse) to the Principia, from either Catholic or
Dutch Reformed forces.
Pointing out that Descartes was writing only a decade after the trial of Galileo,
Schuster points out that “Descartes could have sworn up and down the anti-realist
Copernican tenor in the text…” It is evident that Schuster’s concern is to explain this
seeming lack of commitment to Copernican cosmology in a book that Schuster
brilliantly reveals to be an exercise in radical realist Copernicanism; he does not take
the opportunity to discuss the social and institutional dominance of contemporary
Catholicism, or Calvinism. Similarly, he does not provide an excursus on the
sociological background to contemporary pneumatology and demonology when
accounting for the invocation of spirits and active agencies in nature by mechanical
philosophers:
It is fashionable, and correct, to maintain that later seventeenth-century
mechanists, at least in England, made considerable capital out of what often
was a necessity—political, religious, or technical—of acknowledging some
forms and types of ‘spirit’ and active agency in nature. Nevertheless, it is not
correct then to infer that the ‘mechanical’ philosophy is a misplaced or non-
existent historical category… (p. 598).
Schuster always indicates where he stands on these historiographical matters, but his
own contribution is confined to detailed analysis of Descartes’s reasoning and its
relations to the thought of others, whether scholastics, or rival new philosophers, such
as Beeckman, Galileo, Gassendi, and others. The prospective reader should be aware,
therefore, that they are embarking on a detailed technical account of Cartesian
physics, not on a history of early modern Europe.
The result is undeniably a tour de force and a work that should surely
supersede many of the analyses of Descartes’s philosophy that have gone before it.
Showing the importance of optical ideas for Descartes’s system, and how this led on
to a sophisticated use of hydrodynamics, Schuster’s account makes more sense of
Cartesian physics than anyone has managed hitherto. He also provides a superb
account of Descartes’s tripartite matter theory and the reasons for the crucial
differences between the versions presented in Le Monde and the later Principia. One
of the most outstanding features in a work of many highlights is the culminating
discussion of “the Principia as a Triumph of Novel and Daring System-Binding”
(p.543). Here Schuster shows that the Principia, by incorporating notions inspired by
the “cosmic magnetism” of William Gilbert, and the recently accepted cosmological
phenomena of new stars and sunspots, came to be seen by Descartes as the thoroughly
comprehensive system of nature which he was never able to provide when writing Le
Monde. Seeing all this fall into place, under Schuster’s expert guidance, gives the
reader a palpable sense of Descartes’s excitement (and indeed of Schuster’s as he
reconstructs it, arguably for the first time since Descartes published it) as he genuinely
began to think, and as he stated explicitly at the end of the Principia, “That no
phenomena of nature have been omitted from this treatise.”
Descartes’s system was ultimately a failed attempt to provide a systematic
account of the natural world, and it is all too easy to regard its great influence on the
subsequent generation as little more than a historical accident at a time when thinkers
desperately required a replacement for the collapsing Aristotelian system. Schuster’s
new account of Descartes and his struggles to develop a coherent and cogent system
shows just how ingenious and seemingly powerful Descartes’s system was, and how
easy it was, therefore, for contemporaries to overlook its obvious flaws. Schuster
shows us that although Descartes’s system was a failure, it was a truly magnificent
failure—and in showing us this so forcefully and authoritatively, Schuster ensures that
his own book is a great success.
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